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INVOLUNTARINESS AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS UNDER SECTION 16(b) OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
In enacting section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934,' Congress sought a statute that was easy to administer and
by its clear-cut terms discouraged litigation. It was adopted to "protect
the interests of the public against the predatory operation of directors,
officers and principal stockholders of corporations by preventing them
from speculating in the stock of the corporations to which they owe a
fiduciary duty."2 This policy is promoted by allowing the issuer of se-
curities,3 or a stockholder suing on its behalf, to recover any profit re-
alized by corporate insiders4 on certain transactions involving the issu-
er's securities. In part, section 16(b) provides:
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
2. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
3. Section 16(b) coverage extends to any class of equity security of a corporation
registered under section 12 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). Sec-
tion 12 requires registration by an issuer of a class of equity securities listed on a na-
tional securities exchange. In addition, for every issuer having assets exceeding
$1,000,000, section 12(g) requires the registration of each class of equity security held
of record by 500 or more persons if such issuer is engaged in interstate commerce, or
in a business affecting such commerce, or if its securities are traded by use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
4. The term "insider" refers to any person who is a director or officer of the
issuer or any person or entity who is either directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of 10% of any class of any equity securities covered by section 16(b).
The determination of which persons are included within these categories has been
the subject of many section 16(b) controversies. When there is proof of deputization,
a partnership or a corporation may be held liable as a director. Feder v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
When there is no deputization, however, a director is required to return any profits made
by him, but not profits earned by a partnership of which he is a member. Blau v. Leh-
man, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962). An investor is a 10% beneficial owner if his deben-
tures are convertible into 10% or more of the issuer's equity securities. Chemical Fund,
Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1967).
The Securities and Exchange Commission defines "officer" as a "president, vice-
president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person who performs for an
issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those per-
formed by the foregoing officers." SEC Rule 3b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1975). The
mere fact that someone holds the title of an officer does not necessarily subject him to
16(b) liability. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949); see Schimmel v.
Goldman, 57 F.R.D. 481, 485-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
[679]
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director,
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit re-
alized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an ex-
empted security within any period of less than six months) ... shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any inten-
tion on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in en-
tering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months. . . . This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the se-
curity involved. .... 5
No proof of actual abuse of inside information or intent to profit on
inside information is required. 6
Section 16(b) appears on its face to be straight-forward, and for
the most part the early applications of the statute posed no problems
for the courts. Recent decisions, however, have turned 16(b) into one
of the most widely litigated provisions of the federal securities laws.
Although the section has endured without statutory change for forty
years, judicial interpretation has substantially altered its application.
The Supreme Court has rendered decisions in only three cases involv-
ing 16(b).7 While the Court sought in these decisions to relieve some
of the confusion that lower court interpretations had generated, the ef-
fect has been to leave the provision with many ambiguities and incon-
sistencies which require further clarification. This note will scrutinize
these remaining difficulties and will suggest some possible methods by
which they may be resolved. The discussion will begin with a review
of the Supreme Court decision that adopted the "pragmatic approach"
to interpreting section 16(b).8  Analysis of the circumstances under
which this approach should apply9 and the factors relevant to its appli-
cation 0 will follow. Finally, inquiry will focus on the recent conflict
among the circuit courts of appeals concerning interpretation of the ex-
emption provision to 16(b)."
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
6. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582,
595 (1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425 (1972); Blau
v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967);
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
7. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582
(1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Blau v. Lehman,
368 U.S. 403 (1962).
8. See text accompanying notes 17-30 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 32-43 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 44-66 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 67-103 infra.
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Development of the Pragmatic Approach
Until 1973, the greatest confusion in 16(b) cases centered around
whether the proper approach to interpretation of the section was to be
"pragmatic" or "objective." The objective method of interpretation
was developed in early 16(b) cases, in which the courts adopted a
stringently literal and often harsh construction of its provisions. This
approach required the courts to employ the conclusive presumptions
that (1) insiders had access to inside information and (2) insiders had
abused inside information simply by engaging in profitable transactions
within a limited period of time."2 Thus, liability under 16(b) resulted
simply by a showing that a director, officer or 10 percent shareholder
had purchased and sold stock within a six month period. As a conse-
quence of this interpretation, section 16(b) was regarded as an arbi-
trary, Draconian trap for the unsophisticated and poorly counseled. 13
Dissatisfaction with the objective method of interpretation led to the
development of a more "pragmatic" or subjective application of section
16(b).
The pragmatic approach evolved from the courts' attempts to ap-
ply 16(b) to "unorthodox transactions"'14 and other transactions posing
interpretive problems. This method looks more to the policy and in-
tent of the statute and less to its literal terms. Disagreement in the
circuit courts over which mode of interpretation to use raged for many
years, and the Supreme Court systematically chose not to consider the
issue."'5 One circuit court judge, reflecting the prevailing confusion,
12. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943).
13. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967); Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading,
54 CORNELL L. REv. 45 (1968); Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down the Barn In Order To Kill the Rats," 52
CORNELL L. REv. 69 (1966). See also 2 L. Loss, SEcuES REGULATION 1087-90 (2d
ed. 1961); W. PAINTER, FEDEAL REGULATION OF INSmER TR~nANG 36 (1968).
14. The term "unorthodox transaction" refers to non-cash transactions such as
stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and other corporate reorganizations,
stock reclassifications, and dealings in options, rights, and warrants. See 2 L. Loss, SE-
cunrrms REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961). The term is an accepted part of section 16
(b) vocabulary. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582, 593 n.24 (1973).
15. See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO Gen. Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 854 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 927 (1959); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 847
(1954).
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expressed the hope that "[plerhaps the Supreme Court one day soon
will tell us how these somewhat conflicting approaches to section 16(b)
by the Court of Appeals are to be resolved.
16
Finally, in 1973, the Supreme Court formally adopted the prag-
matic approach in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp.'" The problem presented to the Court was whether, in the con-
text of a merger, an exchange of stock or the granting of an option con-
stituted a "sale" within the meaning of section 16(b).
Occidental, pursuant to a cash tender offer, acquired more than
10 percent of the outstanding stock of Old Kern during May and June
1967. The attempted takeover was blocked, however, by a defensive
merger negotiated between Old Kern and Tenneco, Inc. Occidental,
faced with the possibility of holding a substantial but minority position
in Tenneco, granted a Tenneco subsidiary an option to purchase the
Tenneco shares that Occidental would receive pursuant to the merg-
er. i 8 Old Kern stock was exchanged for Tenneco stock and Old Kern
was dissolved, with all assets transferred to New Kern.'9 Upon com-
pletion of the merger and exercise of the option, New Kern brought
suit for the recovery of $19.5 million in profits realized by Occidental.
Under the strict objective method of interpretation advocated by
many of the early cases, liability would have been certain. The defini-
tion of the term "sale" as used in the Securities and Exchange Act in-
cludes "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of' securities.20 Under
16. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 539 (8th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
17. 411 U.S. 582, 594 & n.26 (1973).
18. By the terms of the option agreement, Tenneco could not exercise the option
prior to a date six months and one day after the date Occidental acquired the stock.
The six-month-and-one-day term was included specifically to prevent the exercise of the
option from being classified as a 16(b) sale. 411 U.S. at 588-89.
19. Among the assets included in the transfer from Old Kern to New Kern were
"all claims, demands, rights and choses in action accrued or to accrue under and by vir-
tue of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... ." 411 U.S. at 589.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970). Interpreting the definitions of section 3(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 literally, the courts applying the objective ap-
proach were willing to extend 16(b) liability to any transaction falling within the broad
definition of purchase and sale. Section 3(a) states:
"When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(13) The [term] . . . 'purchase' . . . include[s] any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire.
(14) The [term] . . . 'sale' . . . include[s] any contract to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14) (1970).
The unyielding, mechanistic fashion in which courts applied these definitions is evi-
dent in an early 16(b) case, in which the court said: "Defendants did not own the com-
mon stock in question before they exercised their option to convert; they did afterward.
Therefore they acquired the stock, within the meaning of the Act." Park & Tilford, Inc.
v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
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this definition, both the exchange of stock and the exercise of the op-
tion could have been termed "sales"-for purposes of section 16(b) lia-
bility. The Court in Kern recognized that several decisions had been
read as requiring an "objective" test but chose to affirm the greater
weight of authority and apply a "pragmatic" approach. The Court con-
cluded that deviation from the statutory definition of a "sale" was justi-
fied in the case of "unorthodox" transactions-transactions "not ordi-
narily deemed a sale or purchase."'21
The pragmatic approach involves an inquiry into "whether the
transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought
to prevent-the realization of short-swing profits based upon access to
inside information . *.. "2 The Court in Kern determined that nei-
ther the exchange of stock pursuant to the merger nor the grant of the
option had been susceptible to speculative abuse of inside information;
thus, neither transaction had been a "sale. ' 23  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court emphasized (1) the lack of access to inside information
and (2) the involuntariness of the transaction.24
Although previous cases had used the pragmatic approach, the
emphasis of the Court in Kern on lack of access was unique. Prior
to Kern, courts had generally avoided any serious inquiry into the in-
sider's potential access to inside information, adopting instead the con-
clusive presumption of insider access.25 When resorting to the prag-
matic approach, the courts had focused on determining whether a con-
current but distinct presumption of actual abuse had been rebutted by
a showing that the transaction in question had not afforded the insider
an opportunity to misuse inside information. 26  Rebuttal of the pre-
21. 411 U.S. at 594.
22. Id.
23. Section 16(b) liability was predicated on Occidental's purchase of more than
10% of Old Kern stock pursuant to its tender offer, making it a "beneficial owner"
within the terms of the statute. Two theories for 16(b) liability were asserted-(1) Oc-
cidental had followed the purchase with a "sale" within six months when it became irrev-
ocably entitled to exchange its Old Kern stock for Tenneco stock pursuant to the terms
of the Old'Kern-Tenneco defensive merger, and (2) Occidental had followed the pur-
chase with a "sale" within six months when it granted an option on its Tenneco share,
even though the option by its terms could not be exercised until at least six months after
the date that Occidental became an "insider" by acquirinig more than 10% of Old Kern's
stock. Id. at 595-96.
24. 411 U.S. at 599-600.
25. See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959). In Ferralolo, the court found that the insider was not privy to
any inside information concerning the company. Nevertheless, the opinion held "such
considerations . . .entirely irrelevant to the applicability of Section 16(b) . I..." d.
at 344.
26. In the cases involving conversion of stock of a corporation, for example, the
courts found that a conversion does not afford the insider an opportunity to abuse inside
information. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
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sumption of access, although probably considered by courts in reaching
their decisions, was never articulated as a basis for rebuttal of the pre-
sumption of actual abuse.
In Kern, however, the finding that there was no possibility of spec-
ulative abuse was clearly tied to a finding that there was no access. The
Court concluded that there was nothing to indicate either the "possibil-
ity of inside information being available to Occidental. . .or the po-
tential for speculative abuse of such inside information .... -27 This
language indicates that the Court reached its determination by consid-
ering two separate elements, the possibility of access and the potential
for abuse. It is evident that in all cases lack of access necessarily pre-
cludes potential for abuse. Thus, the Court's finding as to access would
appear in itself to be determinative of the issue of liability under
16(b).
Furthermore, the involuntariness of the transaction had never
been discussed as a relevant factor in prior 16(b) cases, yet the Kern
Court found that "[tihe critical fact is that the exchange took place
and was required pursuant to a merger between Old Kern and Ten-
neco."2  The Court further emphasized that it was the combination
of the involuntariness and the absence of possibility of abuse which pre-
vented 16(b) liability.29
Kern left little doubt that some form of the pragmatic approach
would be used in determining whether an unorthodox transaction is a
"purchase" or "sale." This result is not surprising, as the lower courts
had applied the pragmatic approach principally to determine whether
these types of transactions fell within the 16(b) definition of "pur-
chase" and "sale." The Court in Kern went on, however, to state ex-
plicitly that the pragmatic approach would not be employed in inter-
preting the terms "purchase" and "sale" for orthodox transactions:
"[T]raditional cash for stock transactions that result in a purchase and
sale or a sale and purchase within the six month, statutory period are
clearly within the purview of section 16(b) . . . ."' While previous
U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959).
27. 411 U.S. at 599.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 600.
30. Id. at 593.
This contention was advanced by the circuit court opinion in Kern: "[W]n the case
of a garden-variety purchase and sale or sale and purchase within six months, the situa-
tions to which Congress' attention was primarily addressed when it enacted § 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, the statute operates as a 'crude rule of thumb,' and that
it would be no defense that a person within its terms was operating, by sheer intuition:
from Antarctica or even from outer space." Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
PROBLEMS UNDER SECTION 16(b)
applications of the pragmatic approach had been limited chiefly to cases
involving unorthodox transactions, the opinion in Kern was the first
flatly to exclude the use of the pragmatic approach in cases involving
orthodox transactions.
Scrutiny of the Kern Analysis
In the discussion of section 16(b) in Kern, the Court purported
to clarify some of the guidelines that are to be followed in cases involv-
ing the provision. Nonetheless, the Court chose merely to scrutinize
the facts of the case before it; it failed to articulate a systematic applica-
tion of the pragmatic approach to which courts could resort in varying
situations. Among the questions created or left unresolved by the
Court in Kern are:
1) Why should the pragmatic approach be restricted to unortho-
dox transactions?
2) What is an unorthodox transaction?
3) What are the factors to be considered in determining the po-
tential for speculative abuse?
4) Should the exemption provision81 in 16(b) be deemed inap-
plicable to the very purchase that makes an investor a 10 percent
holder?
An examination and possible resolution of each of these problems
follows.
Should the Pragmatic Approach Be Restricted to
Unorthodox Transactions?
By expressly restricting the use of the pragmatic approach to unor-
thodox transactions,32 the Court reached a result that is at once un-
precedented and theoretically inconsistent. Liability, instead of being
based on the potential for speculative abuse, is based purely on the
form of the transaction.
As earlier 16(b) cases demonstrate, the pragmatic approach was
developed not merely to resolve ambiguities in the statutory language
F.2d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 1971), affd sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
The court went on to say that in such orthodox transactions the only way to avoid
section 16(b) liability is "to see to it that the matching transaction is postponed beyond
the six months period ... ." Id. at 162. This statement would imply that the pre-
sumptions of access and abuse of inside information are conclusive in the case of ortho-
dox transactions.
31. The exemption provision to section 16(b) provides that a 10% owner must
be such at the time of both purchase and sale (or sale and purchase). See note 78 &
accompanying text infra.
32. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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of section 16(b), but largely to ameliorate the purposeless harshness
that resulted from a mechanical application of the statute. These early
cases determined that the definitions of "purchase" and "sale" as pro-
vided by sections 3(a)(13) and 3(a)(14) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 193413 were to be interpreted not literally, but rather
in light of the preamble to 16(b)--"to prevent the unfair use of inside
information. 34  Proponents of the pragmatic approach argued that the
provisions of section 16(b) should operate only so far as they promote
this policy.
3 5
A distinction based solely on the form of the transaction is thus
unresponsive to the policy which fostered the pragmatic approach, as
the potential for abuse is not necessarily determined by the form of
the transfer. The distinction results, for example, in the anomalous
situation in which a defendant who decidedly lacked the potential for
speculative abuse of inside information would be held liable if he sold
his stocks for cash but would be blameless if he traded them pursuant
to a merger.
On the other hand, determining which approach to use by means
of this distinction may be justified as a practical matter on the grounds
that it effects certain policies which the courts -have deemed essential
to 16(b) analysis and furthers the will of Congress to the greatest ex-
tent possible. In the case of orthodox transactions, such a distinction
preserves the automatic, literal, and objective approach that Congress
undoubtedly intended for transactions clearly within the section's terms.
In the case of unorthodox transactions, it is somewhat uncertain
whether or not 16(b) applies at all.36 The Court's distinction responds
to this uncertainty by compromising between a harsh, objective, and
automatic application of the statute and a complete escape of its reach.
What Is an Unorthodox Transaction?
Assuming that the Court continues to limit the application of the
pragmatic approach to unorthodox transactions, lower courts will be
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14) (1970).
34. Id. § 78p(b). Under section 3(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, any contract to acquire or dispose of stock would be considered a purchase or sale,
"unless the context otherwise requires." Id. §§ 78c(a) (13), (14) (1970). Courts have
reasoned that in light of the purpose of section 16(b), this literal definition is inap-
plicable because "the context otherwise requires." Cf., e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259
F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
35. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 927 (1959).
36. In Kern, the Supreme Court recognized that the courts have wrestled with the
question of inclusion or exclusion of certain unorthodox transactions within the statutory
definition of purchase and sale. 411 U.S. at 593.
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faced with the problem of determining which transactions are unortho-
dox. In a footnote in Kern, the Court specified as unorthodox trans-
actions stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and other
corporate reorganizations, stock reclassifications, and dealings in op-
tions, rights, and warrants.3 7 The Court went on to say that "[tihe
statutory definitions of 'purchase' and 'sale' are broad and, at least ar-
guably, reach many transactions not ordinarily deemed a sale or pur-
chase. In deciding whether borderline transactions are within the
reach of the statute, the courts have [applied the pragmatic ap-
proach]." 8 Thus it appears that the Court will term "unorthodox" and
will use the pragmatic approach to scrutinize any transaction "not ordi-
narily" deemed a sale or purchase.
This test of unorthodoxy is both ambiguous and irrational. It is
unclear, for example, whether the definition of ordinary purchase and
sale is limited to cash transactions or whether, instead, it is to be deter-
mined by the application of some type of reasonable person standard.
Moreover, neither of these tests of ordinariness relates to the rationale
of the pragmatic approach. 9
Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc.,40 is the only
opinion in which a court has specifically considered whether a given
transaction was orthodox or unorthodox. In that case, Provident and
Foremost executed a purchase agreement which provided that Fore-
most would purchase approximately two-thirds of Provident's assets for
$4,250,000 in cash and $49,750,000 in Foremost convertible deben-
tures. The debentures were convertible into common stock in an
amount in excess of 10 percent of Foremost's outstanding shares.
Within six months, Provident entered into an agreement to sell the de-
bentures in the principal amount of $25,000,000 for $25,366,666. Fore-
most contended that Provident, by virtue of its shortlived position as
a 10 percent holder of Foremost securities, was liable for profits from
the sale of the debentures.
Faced with the issue whether the initial exchange of Provident's
assets for Foremost securities was an orthodox or an unorthodox trans-
action, the court defined orthodox as "cash-for-stock or essentially cash-
for-stock. 41  The transaction was determined to be "essentially cash-
for-stock," as the court found no meaningful distinction between con-
sideration in the form of cash and consideration in the form of corpo-
rate assets.42 The "cash-for-stock or essentially cash-for-stock" termi-
37. Id. at 593 n.24.
38. Id. at 593-94.
39. See notes 33-34 & accompanying text supra.
40. 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
41. Id. at 604.
42. Id. at 605.
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nology advanced by the Ninth Circuit to define orthodox transactions
is not useful, however, because it is broad enough to encompass ex-
changes of securities pursuant to mergers, conversions, and the like,
which the courts have traditionally regarded as unorthodox.
Nevertheless, the language in Kern may have suggested a differ-
ent, workable basis for determining which transactions are orthodox
and which are unorthodox. Although the Court did not attempt to dis-
tinguish clearly between the two, the opinion did suggest that involun-
tariness was a factor influencing the decision that 16(b) should not ap-
ply.43 The voluntariness of a transaction could provide a rational
standard for determining orthodoxy and thus whether or not the prag-
matic approach should apply. It can be argued that harshness, which
the pragmatic approach is intended to ameliorate, is increased when
the investor has no control over the transaction. If the pragmatic ap-
proach is not to be used in all cases, it is reasonable to apply it in cir-
cumstances which are the harshest to the investor. Situations charac-
terized by involuntariness thus provide a logical group for which the
pragmatic test should be invoked. The deterrent effect which was in-
tended by the drafters of section 16(b) would be maintained, since an
investor would realize that any voluntary transaction would be subject
to 16(b) liability. Yet when stringent treatment would be pointless
because an investor could not avoid a transaction, a more subjective
approach would be used to determine liability.
Factors To Consider Under the Pragmatic Approach
In Kern, the Court analyzed only a few of the relevant factors to
be considered in determining 16(b) liability under the pragmatic ap-
proach. Moreover, while the Court did emphasize the "involuntary na-
ture of Occidental's exchange. . . coupled with the absence of the pos-
sibility of speculative abuse of inside information,"44 the opinion left
unclear the proper role to be played by these two factors.
Involuntary Nature of the Transaction
The Court's language concerning the involuntariness of the ex-
change in Kern raises two important questions: First, was the Court
imposing an additional requirement for exoneration that is separate
from the requirement that there be no potential for speculative abuse?
Second, assuming that involuntariness is a separate requirement for ex-
oneration, is the requirement imposed on either the opening or closing
transaction, whichever is unorthodox, or merely on the closing transac-
tion?
43. See text accompanying notes 45-53 infra.
44. 411 U.S. at 600.
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The language in Kern is ambiguous, and conflicting conclusions
may be drawn as to whether or not the Court intended the involuntari-
ness of the transaction to be an additional requirement. Some lan-
guage suggests that involuntariness was merely an indication of the lack
of potential for speculative abuse:
There is, therefore, nothing in connection with Occidental's
acquisition of Old Kern stock pursuant to its tender offer to indicate
. . . the potential for speculative abuse of such inside information
by Occidental. Much the same can be said of -the events leading
to the exchange of Occidental's Old Kern stock for Tenneco pre-
ferred. . . . The critical fact is that the exchange took place and
was required pursuant to a merger between Old Kern and Tenneco.
That merger was not engineered by Occidental but was sought by
Old Kern to frustrate the attempts of Occidental to gain control of
Old Kern. Occidental obviously did not participate in or control
the negotiations or the agreement . . . . [Occidental's] absention
was tantamount to a vote against approval of the merger. 45
At least one post-Kern case did not regard involuntariness as a
separate requirement. In Gold v. Sloan,46 the Fourth Circuit made no
reference in either the majority opinion or the dissent to the involuntary
nature of the transaction. Furthermore, the situation facing one of tbe
defendants shows conclusively that the majority did not regard involun-
tariness as a discrete prerequisite for exoneration from liability. De-
fendant Scurlock was one of four directors who voted in favor of a
merger that resulted in the exchange of securities. The final vote fa-
voring the merger was four to three, so defendant Scurlock's vote was
obviously a necessary element in the determination that he would ex-
45. Id. at 599-600 (citations omitted).
46. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). In Gold,
the court employed the pragmatic approach to determine whether an exchange of stock
pursuant to a merger was a section 16(b) purchase. Two of the defendants, Sloan and
Scurlock, had been directors and 10% owners of Atlantic Research Corporation. The
remaining defendants had occupied lower management positions in Atlantic. Pursuant
to a merger, Atlantic stock was exchanged for Susquehanna stock. Both Sloan and Scur-
lock became directors of Susquehanna, with the remaining defendants continuing in
lower management positions in Susquehanna. Within six months after the exchange of
stock, the four defendants sold shares of Susquehanna at a profit.
The lower court found a "potential for abuse" in the circumstances surrounding the
merger and thus found a 16(b) purchase when the defendants exchanged their securities
pursuant to the merger. The court of appeals, reversing in part and affirming in part,
found that only defendant Sloan had had the opportunity to speculate on inside informa-
tion. The court noted that Sloan not only had been in charge of merger negotiations
but also had had extensive knowledge of the financial conditions and prospects of, merger
candidates. Scurlock, on the other hand, was a powerless director who had been ex-
cluded from merger negotiations. He had had no opportunity over and above any other
stockholder to take advantage of any advance knowledge that would have produced a
rise in the market place. As to the remaining two defendants, the court found that they
occupied inferior positions in the management hierarchy and that they had been as igno-
rant of merger developments as any outside stockholder.
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change his stock pursuant to a merger. Therefore, as to Scurlock, the
transaction would clearly have to be characterized as voluntary rather
than involuntary. Within six months of the receipt of stock pursuant
to the merger, Scurlock sold shares at a profit. In reaching the conclu-
sion that Scurlock was not liable under section 16(b), the court must
have disregarded involuntariness as a separate and necessary require-
ment for exoneration.
Nevertheless, other language in Kern suggests the opposite con-
clusion: "[Tihe involuntary nature of Occidental's exchange, when
coupled with the absence of the possibility of speculative abuse of in-
side information, convinces us that § 16(b) should not apply to transac-
tions such as this one."'
47
In Provident Securities Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. ,48 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that absent a showing
of involuntariness, it could not be justified in finding an absence of po-
tential for speculative abuse. 49 While the court thus articulated invol-
untariness as a part of potential for abuse, it nonetheless regarded in-
voluntariness as an ingredient essential to exoneration.
Moreover, it seems reasonable to interpret the involuntariness dis-
cussion in Kern as imposing an additional requirement for exoneration.
Under the pragmatic approach as set forth in Kern, the insider can es-
cape 16(b) liability by showing that he had no access to inside informa-
tion. By thus furnishing insiders a new defense, this rule may narrow
the application of 16(b). Perhaps the Court therefore believed that
a greater showing of harshness should be required-a showing that po-
tential 16(b) liability was the result of an involuntary act-before the
defendant could be relieved of liability.
Assuming that involuntariness is a necessary requirement to pre-
vent 16(b) liability, the Kern Court also left unclear whether the re-
quirement was in reference to any unorthodox transaction or to only
an unorthodox closing transaction. Although no conclusive answer can
be found in Kern, the Court seems to have based its exoneration of
the defendant on the fact that unless relief were granted, an involun-
tary closing transaction after Occidental had purchased the shares
would automatically have subjected it to 16(b) liability. The Court
emphasized that once the Old Kern management had agreed to the
47. 411 U.S. at 600.
48. 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
49. Id. at 606. The court said that implicit in the Kern decision is the limitation
that the defendant should not be exonerated if the defendant could have avoided section
16(b) liability without serious detriment. No evidence was found to suggest that Provi-
dent had been forced to enter into any of the transactions. Absent such a showing of
involuntariness, the court refused to find an absence of the potential for speculative
abuse. Id. at 605-06.
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merger, Occidental was left with "no real choice' '5 0 regarding the future
of its shares. Occidental's only alternative to exchanging its Old Kern
shares pursuant to the merger was to dispose of its shares of Old Kern
for cash before the merger was closed. This sale of shares for cash,
the Court said, would have left Occidental with prima facie 16(b) lia-
bility; therefore it was not a "realistic alternative." 51 The Court's ref-
erence to "no real choice" and to the lack of any "realistic alternative"
suggests that to fulfill the involuntariness requirement and avoid 16(b)
liability, the involuntary transaction must be the transaction that would
automatically subject the defendant to liability. That transaction is the
closing transaction. If the initial transaction were involuntary, an in-
vestor would always have the "realistic alternative" of delaying the clos-
ing transaction for six months and thus avoiding 16(b) liability.
The court in Gold v. Sloan,52 through its inattention to involuntari-
ness, impliedly rejected this position. Moreover, even if involuntari-
ness was a factor in the exoneration from 16(b) liability, the test for
involuntariness did not involve the closing transactions, for in Gold,
these transactions were voluntary for all four defendants. Each had
the opportunity to avoid 16(b) liability merely by delaying the sale of
his securities for six months after acquisition. Nevertheless, three of
the defendants were found not liable.
53
The position implied in Gold, however, seems unreasonable. The
argument that the involuntariness of a transaction should invoke the
pragmatic approach is based on the harshness of these transactions. The
validity of this rationale therefore depends on requiring that the closing
transaction be involuntary. In a situation involving an involuntary
opening transaction and a voluntary closing transaction, an insider may
avoid any harsh results under 16(b) simply by postponing his closing
transaction for six months. In the case of the involuntary closing trans-
action, however, the insider is unable to avoid liability, and his liability
is the direct result of action taken by another.
Potential for Speculative Abuse
The second major element in determining a 16(b) purchase or
sale is the "potential for speculative abuse." Courts have referred to
this concept without articulating the factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether the potential for speculative abuse exists. Kern and
50. 411 U.S. at 600. The Court pointed out that "although various lawsuits were
begun in state and federal courts seeking to postpone the merger closing beyond the
statutory six-month period, those efforts were futile." Id.
51. Id.
52. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 353. In Provident, the court did not deal with the issue, as both trans-
aptions were found to have been voluntary. 506 F.2d at 606.
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earlier 16(b) cases do, however, suggest two situations in which the
potential for speculative abuse is absent and in which there is thus no
resulting 16(b) liability: first, that in which the transaction cannot pos-
sibly lend itself to the abuse of inside information; second, that in which
there is no possibility of access to inside information. It is apparent
from earlier case law that the existence of the first situation is sufficient
to relieve a defendant from liability.14  The Court in Kern suggested
that the second situation will also protect a defendant from liability,
subject only to the somewhat unclear requirement of involuntariness.
The situation in which the kind of transaction cannot possibly lend
itself to the abuse of inside information is most evident in the case of
a conversion or a gift. Although both kinds of transfers are subsumed
under the broad definitions of "purchase" and "sale" under section
3(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,55 neither one falls
within the narrower meaning of these terms under section 16(b).
The gift situation is illustrated by the facts in Truncale v. Blum-
berg.5 6 In this case, the defendant had received warrants pursuant to
an employment contract. Within six months, he made gifts of the war-
rants to a variety of charitable organizations. The court felt it was ab-
surd to consider the gifts as 16(b) sales:
[A]gainst the background of a statute designed to raise the stand-
ards . . . against shortswing speculation by insiders with advance
information. . . it is hard to see any relation whatsoever between
gifts to charities and trading for profit in the market place.57
In the conversion cases,58 the theory is that the conversion of
shares of a single issuer is merely the exchange of one form of security
for an economically equivalent form. Because of the equivalence,
there is no potential for speculative abuse. Blau v. Max Factor & Co.59
was one of the first 16(b) cases to deal with conversions. In Max Fac-
tor, the issuer had two classes of stock-class A stock, which was pub-
licly held, and common stock, which was held by certain insiders.8 0 Un-
54. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14) (1970). See note 20 supra.
56. 80 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
57. ld. at 389.
58. See Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 892
(1965). See also Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need
for Clarification, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 772 (1971); Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New
Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. Ryv. 45 (1968).
In 1966, the Securities and Exchange Commission exercised its exemptive power
under 16(b) to adopt Rule 16b-9, which under specified conditions excludes a conversion
from the operation of 16(b). SEC Rule 16b-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1975).
59. 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
60. See id. at 306. The two classes of stock had been created to permit the pay-
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der the corporation's charter, common stock was exchangeable for class
A stock, share for share, at any time. In contemplation of selling a
portion of their holdings to the public, the insiders exchanged 200,000
shares of common stock for an equal number of class A shares and ap-
proximately one month later sold the class A shares to the public. The
Ninth Circuit refused to find that the exchange of common for class
A stock was a purchase of stock within the meaning of section 16(b),
reasoning that:
[The insiders'] investment commitment in Max Factor & Co.
was a long term one, undertaken . . . many years prior to their
exchange of Common for Class A. The exchange of Class A for
Common did not interrupt the continuity of [the insiders'] invest-
ment; it did not increase or decrease the amount invested, or alter
in any way the risk assumed long years before. Moreover, since
there was no speculative advantage in holding Class A rather than
Common, the exchange conferred no opportunity for speculative
profit which the [insiders] did not already enjoy.
61
Kern was the first case to articulate the second situation which
would demonstrate an absence of the potential for speculative abuse.
The Court suggested that if there is no possibility of access to inside
information, the potential for speculative abuse does not exist. Never-
theless, the opinion in Kern provides an inadequate description of the
types of situations in which the possibility of access is lacking. The
opinion merely suggests that there must be some degree of hostility be-
tween the defendant and the issuer's management. In finding that the
possibility was "extremely remote" that the defendant had, or had the
opportunity to have, any confidential information, the Court discussed
the fact that Occidental was threatening to seize control of Old Kern,
and displace its management. The Court emphasized Old Kern man-
agement's vigorous and immediate opposition to Occidental's takeover
efforts and Old Kern management's refusal to discuss with Occidental
the possibility of an Old Kern-Occidental merger." This discussion in
Kern would indicate that the defendant cannot voluntarily exclude him-
self from access to inside information; rather, there -has to be some hos-
tility between the defendant and the controlling interest of the issuer
which would deprive the defendant of this access.
ment of maximum dividends to the public shareholders while retaining earnings other-
wise payable to the insiders for use in the business without exposing the insiders to po-
tential tax liability. Id.
61. Id. at 308. In another case, the court held the doctrine of economic equiva-
lence applicable only to exchanges involving the securities of a single issuer. In the ex-
change of stock pursuant to a merger, securities of a different issuer are received; there-
fore the economic equivalence theory does not apply. Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425
F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
62. 411 U.S. at 598-99.
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If such a guideline was intended by the Court in Kern, the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Gold v. Sloan6" indicates confusion as to its proper
application. The court in Gold did discuss management's hostility to-
ward defendant Scurlock, 64 and on that basis it found him not liable.
Nevertheless, the court absolved defendant Glenn L. Sloane of liability
because "'there was no evidence indicating .. . [he] had an oppor-
tunity to avail' himself of any inside information .. . ."I" The result
as to Glenn L. Sloane involved no finding of hostility. This haphazard
application of the hostility factor in Gold indicates the desirability of
a more definite guideline.
It is also important to emphasize that despite this need for eluci-
dation, it is at least clear that the possibility of speculative abuse must
involve inside information. This position was articulated in Kern, in
which the Court held that speculation by an investor that he could sell
his interest at a profit if his takeover attempt was met by a defensive
merger was not the kind of speculative abuse at which the statute was
aimed."6 Such an investor would not be an insider at the time he for-
mulated his takeover plan and therefore could not be speculating on
the basis of inside information.
Interpretation of the Exemption Provision
Another difficulty that has developed following the Kern decision
concerns the interpretation of the exemption provision of section 16
(b). Under this provision, a beneficial owner will not be liable under
16(b) unless he owned 10 percent of the issuer's stock both at the time
of the purchase and at the time of the sale.67 The problem facing the
courts in these cases has been the interpretation of the phrase "at the
time of purchase." Does the phrase require for a finding of liability
63. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
64. Id. at 344. Sharp differences had developed between Scurlock and A. Sloan,
who had undisputed control of the corporation. Although Scurlock retained member-
ship on the board of directors, it was only because cumulative voting enabled him to
do so. The court characterized Scurlock as "simply a disaffected stockholder and power-
less director, tolerated but not welcomed by the management." Id. Scurlock was also
excluded from any merger negotiations carried on by the corporation. See id. at 345.
65. Id. at 351.
66. In Kern, the Court was unwilling to apply section 16(b) to speculative abuse
that was not based on the use of insider information. It was held that a tender offeror's
calculations that he may be able to resell the stock at a profit to a partner in a defensive
merger "do not represent the kind of speculative abuse at which the statute is aimed,
for they could not have been based on inside information obtained from substantial
stockholdings that did not yet exist." 411 U.S. at 597.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). The exemption provision directs that a bene-
ficial owner must be such at the time of purchase and sale or sale and purchase. To
facilitate analysis, only a purchase followed by a sale will be mentioned, although the
discussion is equally applicable to a sale followed by a purchase.
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that the investor own 10 percent prior to the alleged 16(b) purchase,
or is it sufficient that he hold 10 percent simultaneously with the al-
leged 16(b) purchase? If an investor, for example, acquires 10 per-
cent of the stock of a corporation through a single purchase and within
six months sells his holdings, was he a 10 percent owner "at the time
of purchase"? This issue is now before the Supreme Court68 as a result
of the decision by the Ninth Circuit in Provident Securities Co. v. Fore-
most-McKesson, Inc.69 The holding by the Ninth Circuit is directly
contrary to a long-standing rule announced by the Second Circuit7" and
recently followed by the Eighth Circuit.'
The Second Circuit case interpreting the exemption provision to
16(b) was Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.72  The defendant
originally owned less than 10 percent of the outstanding shares of Kai-
ser-Frazer Corporation. The company subsequently increased its hold-
ings to 21 percent and within six months sold shares at a profit. The
district court held that the 16(b) language "at the time of" must be
construed to mean "simultaneously with" rather than "prior to."
'73  It
concluded therefore that the very purchase by which an investor be-
comes an owner of 10 percent or more of the issuer's stock is a 16(b)
transaction. The court reasoned that this construction was more con-
sistent with the declared purpose of the statute-to prevent the unfair
use of inside information.74  The Second Circuit affirmed this part of
the decision.75
When the same issue was brought before the Ninth Circuit eight-
een years later in Provident, the court relied primarily on legislative
history and concluded, contrary to the Stella rule, that the statutory lan-
guage requires a 10 percent beneficial owner to be held liable under
16(b) only if he was a 10 percent owner prior to the time of pur-
chase.76  Since Provident had not owned 10 percent prior to the ac-
68. The same issue has been before the Supreme Court twice in recent years.. In
1972, the Court noted the issue but declined to decide it because a cross petition for
certiorari bad not been filed. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418,
421 (1972). In Kern, the Court again had the issue before it, but chose to decide the
case on other grounds. 411 U.S. at 584.
69. 506 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
70. See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
71. See Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970),
aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
72. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (summary judgment denied), 132 F. Supp.
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (on merits), affd in part and remanded in part, 232 F.2d 299
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 83 (1956).
73. Id. at 960.
74. Id.
75. 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
76. 506 F.2d 601, 614 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
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quisition which increased its holdings to more than 10 percent, the
court held that Provident could not be characterized as a 10 percent
holder "at the time of purchase."
Relevant Period of Inquiry
The critical question in the Stella-Provident conflict concerns the
relevant period of inquiry for the potential for abuse. There are two
possible periods of inquiry. The first applies to situations in which
there is potential for abuse of inside information prior to the initial
transaction. 77  In this type of case, the insider's knowledge has influ-
enced both the opening and the closing transactions. The second pos-
sible period of inquiry is appropriate to cases in which an investor
makes his initial transaction with no specific inside information but re-
ceives such information before his sale. There is still an opportunity
for speculative abuse of inside information in the second situation, but
it is unclear whether 16(b) was intended to reach such abuses.
In relation to this discussion, the connection between 10 percent
ownership and potential for abuse may thus be explained as follows:
If 16(b) liablity is premised on a finding of 10 percent ownership both
at the time of purchase and at the time of sale, the potential for abuse
must exist before the purchase. If, on the other hand, an investor is
liable if he owned 10 percent either at the time of purchase or at the
time of sale, the potential for abuse may arise between the time of pur-
chase and the time of sale.
In analyzing the relevant period of inquiry for a 10 percent holder,
it is important that a distinction be made between a 10 percent holder
on one hand and an officer or director on the other. The distinction
arises from the statute itself, which treats directors and officers as one
category of insiders and 10 percent owners as another. In drafting the
section, Congress expressly narrowed the scope of liability for 10 per-
cent owners through the exemption provision, which states:
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the
purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security in-
volved. .... 78
77. The key feature of this type of abuse is that the insider has inside information
before he makes his initial transaction. This type of abuse occurs, for example, when
an insider learns about a future rise in price, purchases while the price is low, and sells
the stock after it rises in price. See generally Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing
Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REV.
592 (1974).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (emphasis added). Note that the phrase "such
beneficial owner" in the exemption clause of section 16(b) refers to section 16(a),
which defines a beneficial owner as: "Every person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other
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Because this section requires that only 10 percent beneficial owners be
such at the time of both purchase and sale, 16(b) by implication ap-
plies to officers and directors as long as they were such either at the
time of purchase or at the time of sale.
From this implication, it logically follows that the relevant period
of inquiry for officers or directors would include both the time prior
to the opening transaction and the time between the opening transac-
tion and the closing transaction. Case law supports this double period
of inquiry, as officers or directors have been held liable for abuse dur-
ing either period. In Adler v. Klawans,79 it was held that section 16
(b) imposed liability on a person who was a director on the date of
sale whether or not he was a director on the date of purchase.80 Sub-
sequently, in Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,81 16(b) was applied to
a person who was a director on the date of purchase, although he was
not a director at the time of sale.
The danger of confusing a 10 percent holder status with officer
or director status in determining the relevant period of inquiry is il-
lustrated by the decision in Gold v. Sloan.82  In Gold, the defendants
acquired stock of the issuer by means of an exchange of shares pursu-
ant to a merger. Two of the defendants subsequently became directors
of the issuer. Under the rationale of Klawans, an inquiry as to the po-
tential for abuse during the period after the defendants became direc-
tors would have been appropriate to determine 16(b) liability. The
than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to '[this Act] .... " Id.
§78p(a) (1970). See note 3 supra.
79. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). Klawans involved a defendant who, through
another, purchased stock of Williams-McWilliams Industries, Inc. at various times be-
tween October 1, 1956 and January 17, 1957. He became a director on March 1'8, 1957,
and by May 3, 1957, he had completely divested himself of all his holdings.
80. Accord, Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970) (alternative
holding); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The justification given in Klawans
for holding a director liable for purchases made before he assumed his position was that
"[g]enerally, although there are important exceptions in certain circumstances, officers
and directors have more ready access to the intimate business secrets of corporations
and factors which can affect the real and ultimately the market value of stock than does
even so large a stockholder as a '10% beneficial owner'. . . . Moreover, a director or
officer can usually stimulate more directly actions which affect stock values and have
knowledge of factors which might depress values." 267 F.2d at 845.
81. 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). Bunker,
the president and chief executive of Martin Marietta, served as a director of Sperry Rand
Corporation from April 29, 1963 to August 1, 1963, when he resigned. During the pe-
riod of his directorship, Martin Marietta purchased over 100,000 shares of Sperry stock.
Between August 29, 1963, and September 6, 1963, Martin Marietta sold all of its Sperry
stock. The plaintiff, on behalf of Sperry Rand, was allowed to recover profits made
by Martin Marietta from the stock acquired during Bunker's term as a director.
82. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
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majority in Gold, however, failing to consider the distinction between
a 10 percent holder and an officer or director, restricted the inquiry
to the period prior to the initial transaction.
It is highly questionable whether this rule developed by the ma-
jority in Gold should be followed in future cases involving officers or
directors. Earlier interpretations of the statute appear clearly to direct
inquiry during the six month period in the case of an officer or di-
rector.83
In addition, there does not appear to be any reason for changing
the relevant period of inquiry for officers or directors simply because
the opening transaction is unorthodox. The potential for abuse of in-
side information during the period following the initial transaction is
equally great, in the case of an officer or director, whether the initial
transaction is orthodox or unorthodox.
While the relevant period of inquiry for an officer or director ap-
pears, with minor exceptions,84 to be settled, the relevant period of in-
quiry for a 10 percent owner in both orthodox and unorthodox situa-
tions has always been unclear. After the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Provident, it remains uncertain whether or not a defendant must be a
10 percent owner prior to the opening purchase and thus whether or
not the defendant must show a potential for speculative abuse prior to
his initial transaction. For many years, cases following the rule in
Stella have offered strong support for the proposition that the potential
for abuse through 10 percent ownership need not exist prior to the ini-
tial transaction.
The Second Circuit, for example, reached this conclusion in New-
mark v. RKO General, Inc.8 5  It held that a potential for abuse follow-
ing the very transaction which made an investor a 10 percent holder
was sufficient to impose 16(b) liability. The rationale employed was
that potential for abuse during the period following the opening trans-
action may be a basis for liability:
The statutory reference to a ten percent beneficial owner rests on
the presumption that an owner of this quantity of securities has ac-
cess to inside information. Although this presumption would not
justify the conclusion that one who purchases a quantity of shares
83. See notes 79-80 & accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 82-83 & accompanying text supra.
85. 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970). In April 1967,
the managements of Frontier Airlines, Inc. and Central Airlines, Inc. reached a provi-
sional agreement to merge their companies. On May 3 or 4, 1967, defendant RKO, who
controlled Frontier, contracted to purchase 49% of Central's outstanding shares at a
fixed price. On September 18, the purchase agreement was executed and RKO received
49% of Central's shares. On October 1, the Central shares were exchanged pursuant
to the merger. The court held there was a "purchase" and "sale" of Central's stock
within the meaning of section 16(b).
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which makes him a ten percent beneficial owner has done so on
the basis of inside information, the presumed access to such in-
formation resulting from this purchase provides him with an oppor-
tunity, not available to the investing public, to sell his shares at the
moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a purchase of shares
which makes the buyer an insider creates an opportunity for the
type of speculative abuse the statute was enacted to prevent.8 6
In Gold, the Fourth Circuit also indicated that potential for abuse
prior to the initial transaction was not required for 16(b) liability.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Gold apparently
reached this conclusion, although they based the result on somewhat
conflicting grounds. The court in Gold was dealing with people who
were officers and directors as well as 10 percent holders. Both ma-
jority and dissent, however, relied primarily on an interpretation of
Kern, which concerned 10 percent owners exclusively. Thus it ap-
pears that the entire court would apply the interpretation used in Gold
if faced with defendants who were solely 10 percent owners.
The majority opinion in Gold interpreted Kern to mean that the
pragmatic approach requires "the specific transaction itself, which con-
stitutes the unorthodox transaction, [to] present the possibility of, or
potential for, exploitation of insider information."8' 7 In investigating
the possibility that the defendants may have had access to inside infor-
mation which would have permitted them to realize shortswing profits,
the court limited its inquiry to the events and the capabilities of the
defendants prior to the effective date of the merger (the initial unor-
thodox transaction). Nevertheless, had the unorthodox transaction
been the closing transaction, the majority in Gold apparently would
have been willing to inquire as to the potential for abuse at any time
during the six month period.
The dissenting opinion in Gold did not interpret Kern as indicat-
ing that the only relevant period for the investigation of the possibility
of abuse was prior to the unorthodox transaction. Instead, it concluded
that the period after the initial transaction presented in all cases a cru-
cial period during which the court should investigate the potential for
abuse in order to determine 16(b) liability. 8  The dissent pointed out
that nothing in the language of the Court's opinion in Kern required
the limitation adopted by the majority. 9 Since two of the defendants
86. Id. at 356.
87. 486 F.2d at 343.
88. Id. at 354 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. id. The dissent in Gold reasoned further that the potential for abuse during
the period prior to the consummation of the merger would provide no basis for applying
section 16(b): "I]t is not the policy of that provision to prevent persons who are not
statutory insiders of the issuer from making speculative abuse of inside information ob-
tained through some other relationship to the issuer." Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
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were directors as well as 10 percent owners, the dissent's conclusion
would also appear to be sound under the reasoning of Klawans.
Klawans, it will be remembered, allowed inquiry as to the potential for
abuse at any time during the six month period when an officer or di-
rector was involved.9°  The dissent, however, did not base its holding
on Klawans; instead it relied upon Kern, which dealt exclusively with
the 10 percent owner. 91 The dissent interpreted the relevant period
of inquiry in Kern to be "during all or part of the six month period
' 9 2
following the initial transaction.
The opinion in Kern itself also offers support for the notion that
potential for abuse during the period following the initial transaction
is sufficient in itself for 16(b) liability. In Kern, the Court found that
the defendant's initial purchase was made without an opportunity to ac-
quire or abuse inside information.93  If the Court had determined that
potential for abuse of inside information must exist prior to the initial
transaction, its inquiry should have proceeded no further. The justices,
however, also inquired as to the possibility of abuse during the period
after the initial transaction and prior to the closing transaction. The
Court found no possibility of abuse during this period,94 but the very
inquiry indicates that the possibility of abuse need not be present prior
to the initial transaction.
Notwithstanding this apparent support for the Stella holding that
the potential for abuse through 10 percent ownership may exist after
the initial transaction, the Ninth Circuit took a contrary position in
Provident. The court in Provident argued that section 16(b) was not
intended to reach situations in which an investor makes his initial trans-
action without having acquired access to inside information through 10
percent ownership. 95 The court felt that any potential for abuse of in-
side information received after the initial transaction was irrelevant.
While it is probably true that Congress, in enacting 16(b), was
primarily concerned with abuse prior to the initial transaction,9" neither
90. See notes 79-80 & accompanying text supra.
91. The dissent in Gold concluded: "[T]he relevant inquiry, in terms of the pur-
poses of § 16(b) and under Kern, is whether the acquisition has put the defendants in
a position to obtain and use inside information in planning a disposition . . .during
all or part of the six months' period following the acquisition." 486 F.2d at 356.
92. Id.; see note 91 supra.
93. 411 U.S. at 596-97.
94. Id.
95. 506 F.2d at 614. There is strong support among commentators for the asser-
tion that this type of abuse is not covered by 16(b). See, e.g., Note, Insider Liability
for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72
MicH. L. REv. 592 (1974); Comment, Short-Swing Profits and the Ten Percent Rule,
9 STAN. L. REv. 582 (1957).
96. The legislative history strongly indicates that section 16(b) was enacted to
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the legislative history nor the statute itself prohibits examination of the
period following the initial transaction to determine whether 16(b) lia-
bility should be imposed.97  As originally drafted, 16(b) provided that
profits received by outsiders from shortswing speculation entered on
the basis of confidential information received from insiders could be
recovered by the issuer."' The court in Provident reasoned that the
curb "in and out" speculation on the basis of inside information. Typical of the abuses
revealed at the congressional hearings was the transaction described in the following re-
port:
" Mhe president of a corporation testified that he and his brothers controlled the
company with a little over 10 per cent of the shares; that shortly before the company
passed a dividend, they disposed of their holdings for upward of $16,000,000 and later
repurchased them for about $7,000,000 showing a profit of approximately $9,000,000 on
the transaction." S. RP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
The records of the hearing also show congressional concern over proving the exist-
ence of the intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months of the purchase.
Thus, Congress apparently deemed important the intent to speculate at the time of the
initial transaction:
"You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the secur-
ity within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence
of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because
you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the
time he bought, to get out on a short swing." Hearings on S. 84, 56 & 97 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6557 (1934)
(emphasis added) (statement of Thomas Corcoran) [hereinafter cited as 1934 Hearings].
Also, the transcript of the discussion leading to the inclusion of the "sale and pur-
chase" provision to complement the "purchase and sale" clause further indicates an ex-
press intent to curb trading when the intent to speculate existed at the time of the initial
transaction.
"Senator ButxLEY: Do you provide for [the case] where a man might sell for a
short term with the intention of repurchasing?" 1934 Hearings, supra, at 6557 (empha-
sis added).
97. Language in the congressional records indicates that Congress intended to
cover abuse of inside information when it existed only after the initial transaction. See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 58-68 (1934): "By this section it is rendered
unlawful for persons intrusted with the administration of corporate affairs or vested with
substantial control over corporations to use inside information for their own advantage."
Id. at 68. It could be argued that Congress was in fact concerned with abuse of inside
information during the six month period and sought simply to make the transaction un-
profitable by making any attempt to purchase and sell (or sell and purchase) within a
six month period futile.
98. At one time prior to passage, subsection (b) (3) provided that it would be un-
lawful for any insider "to disclose, directly or indirectly, any confidential information
regarding or affecting any such registered security not necessary or proper to be dis-
closed as a part of his corporate duties. Any profit made by any person, to whom such
unlawful disclosure shall have been made, in respect of any transaction or transactions
in such registered security within a period not exceeding six months after such disclosure
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer unless such person shall have had no
reasonable ground to believe that the disclosure was confidential or was made not in
the performance of corporate duties." 1934 Hearings, supra note 96, at 6430.
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deletion of the subsection imposing liability on outsiders indicated that
Congress decided to exclude outsiders from 16(b) liability." It may
be argued, however, that the effect of the deletion was to exclude from
liability only outsiders who remain outsiders, and that outsiders who be-
come insiders are still within the reach of the statute. As indicated
by the testimony prior to the passage of 16(b), the "outsider" provision
was apparently deleted because of the difficulty in proving whether or
not information passed to an outsider was confidential. 100 When liabil-
ity is imposed on an outsider who becomes an insider, this difficulty
is not a consideration, since liability is predicated on the newly acquired
status.
Thus, it would seem that the Provident holding that the potential
for abuse based on 10 percent owner status must exist prior to the ini-
tial transaction should not be followed. It may be argued that to im-
pose liability on a 10 percent owner who was not such prior to the initial
transaction would make the exemption provision concerning 10 percent
owners meaningless. This result need not obtain if "at the time of"
is interpreted, as in Stella, to include 10 percent ownership simultane-
ous with as well as prior to the initial transaction. Under this interpre-
tation, the period following the initial transaction is relevant in evaluat-
ing the 10 percent owner's potential for speculative abuse. To con-
tinue to give meaning to the exemption provision, however, 16(b) lia-
bility is limited to purchases made subsequent to or simultaneous with
acquisition of 10 percent ownership.
99. 506 F.2d at 613-14.
100. The following testimony indicates the concern over the difficulty of proving
whether the information passed to an outsider is confidential:
"Mr. CORCORAN. Subparagraph (3) affects the friends to whom these corporation
directors and officers and big stockholders pass on a tip that the stock is going up for
a short swing ...
Senator CAREY. That would mean that if an oil company expected to bring in a
well, and an officer knew of it and imparted that information to a stockholder, it would
be contrary to this law.
Mr. CORCORAN. If that were confidential, and if the stockholder to whom the tip
was imparted knew it was confidential and should not have been disclosed ...
Senator CAREY. I do not see how you can determine when the information is con-
fidential and when it is not.
Mr. CORCORAN. That would depend, sir, upon the nature of the business of the
company and the nature of the information.
Senator CAREY. Suppose he said, 'I have a letter here today from our man out in
the field, and I am certain from what he says that we are going to gave a good well.'
The man goes out into the market and buys.
Mr. CORCORAN. Whether that is a revelation of confidential information depends
upon all the circumstances surrounding the case.
Senator CAREY. I think you are breeding a lot of lawsuits here."
1934 Hearings, supra note 96, at 6560-61.
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Such an interpretation remains within the scope of the express lan-
guage of the statute, while providing a sounder interpretation than that
in Provident. The Provident holding creates a loophole that renders
16(b) largely ineffectual as applied to the 10 percent beneficial owner.
It allows speculation in two specific situations which are prohibited by
Stella. In the first, an investor who owns more than 10 percent of the
stock of an issuer may avoid 16(b) liability by selling to just below 10
percent before repurchasing for the purpose of shortswing speculation.
In the other situation, a holder of less than 10 percent may purchase
an unlimited amount (in a single purchase), abuse inside information
in order to determine when to sell, and still avoid 16(b) liability.
Neither the legislative history nor the language of the statute requires
that these situations be outside the scope of 16(b).
The Stella interpretation would more effectively accomplish the
express purpose of 16(b)-preventing the unfair use of inside infor-
mation. Moreover, the Court has, on a number of occasions, instructed
that "where alternative constructions of the terms of 16(b) are possi-
ble, those terms are to be given the construction that best serves the
congressional purpose of curbing shortswing speculation by corporate
insiders."' 01 The Provident interpretation does not serve this con-
gressional purpose, and in many situations it places an undue restriction
on the operation of the statute. In Provident, for example, the court
found that a clear potential existed for trading on the basis of inside
information acquired after Provident became a 10 percent owner.'02
It was also admitted that "[s]uch trading is exactly the kind of spec-
lative abuse that section 16(b) is designed to discourage."'01 3 Never-
theless, because of the court's interpretation of the exemption provi-
sion, opportunities for speculative abuse which the statute is designed
to discourage were placed beyond the reach of 16(b). If section 16
(b) is to have the prophylactic effect which its drafters intended, insid-
ers must not be permitted to avoid the reach of 16(b) so easily in situ-
ations in which potential for abuse clearly exists.
Conclusion
The confusion that has developed among the circuits over the
proper application of 16(b) may be dispelled only with further direc-
tion from the Supreme Court. The Stella-Provident conflict will be re-
solved soon, as certiorari has been granted in Provident. Hopefully,
the Supreme Court will choose to follow the Stella interpretation, rather
than weaken the reach of 16(b) by adopting the Provident holding.
101. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
102. 506 F.2d at 606.
103. Id.
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Much more difficult to resolve will be the proper application of
the pragmatic approach. No doubt, the intracacies of such an approach
will require that clarification will develop slowly. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court's espousal of the involuntariness standard should provide
a workable framework within which the pragmatic approach may be
applied. This note has suggested two alternative approaches for intro-
duction of the involuntariness standard in 16(b) cases: (1) involuntar-
iness may be used to determine orthodoxy and thus to establish whether
the pragmatic approach is appropriate at all, or (2) involuntariness may
be used as a part of the pragmatic approach to determine whether the
potential for abuse of inside information exists. The adoption of either
of these approaches would be of substantial importance in resolving the
confusion over 16(b) and the pragmatic approach.
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